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Generally, the 1990’s have been classified by various jurisdictions as a 
period that has seen tremendous growth and activity in the area of corporate 
governance. Corporate governance came in at the right time to provide some 
form of insulation from the various economic shockwaves suffered in the 
corporate market thereby ensuring that the newly established economic 
growth was maintained. It must be noted that corporate governance has 
continued to register steady growth around the world over the years.  
However, this growth has been accompanied by various problems 
which if left unchecked may led to breakdowns in the corporate world as will 
be illustrated by this dissertation.  
South Africa is one of the fastest emerging economies of the world and 
this rapid economic growth has been largely attributed to the adoption of 
the King codes and the various corporate governance structures. Against 
this background, this dissertation will begin by discussing the major 
changes that have been made from the King II report to the King III report.  
The driving forces behind this dissertation are contained in chapters 
three and four as these chapters will seek to ascertain some of the major 
progresses and challenges that have been scored in the area of corporate 
governance. Therefore, these problems and developments that will be 
identified by this dissertation will be compared with those that are being 
faced by different jurisdictions around the world paying much emphasis to 
the United Kingdom, United States of America and Asia in an effort to seek 
clarity as to what is currently happening on the international scene. 
Furthermore, it will take a critical look at how these countries have fostered 
growth of corporate governance whilst at the same time looking at how they 
have dealt with the various challenges. 
 The concluding part of this paper will give a summarised version of 
the dissertation and make some recommendations that can help to 
strengthen South Africa’s corporate governance systems and structures into 
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STATEMENTS, OBJECTIVES, DEFINATIONS AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
1.0. Introduction 
Corporate governance is the underlying principle upon which the gamut of a 
company’s corporate existence rests. At the turn of the 21st century, most 
economies in the world had undergone transformation in the area of 
Corporate Governance and how a company’s affairs should be governed. 
However, the pace at which this transformation was achieved had been 
hindered by the legal and social norms including institutions which were 
deeply entrenched in these economies.1 The importance of good corporate 
governance principles cannot be over emphasised as it provides investors 
with a sense of security knowing that their money will be safeguarded and 
managed in the best interest of the company.2 This sense of security that 
comes with good corporate governance makes countries safe havens for 
foreign direct investment which leads to massive capital inflows into those 
economies thereby promoting growth.3Countries that have relaxed in the 
implementation of good corporate governance principles have paid a very 
high price that has resulted in financial scandals and meltdowns of major 
multinational companies which in turn has caused negative ripple effects on 
their economies. It must be noted that poor corporate governance does not 
always produce adverse effects as those which were experienced in the 
financial downfall of major companies such as Maxwell, Enron and 
Parmalat.4 However, the server consequences suffered by these companies 
provide a valuable lesson of what might go wrong when poor corporate 
governance structures are in place. Various economies have continued being 
under siege from corporate disasters and meltdowns despite the multiplicity 
                                                          
1 Luke Nottage et al Corporate Governance in the 21st Century: Japan’s gradual 
transformation (2008) 1. 
2 Brian Coyle Corporate Governance (2010) 1. 
3 Ramani Naidoo Corporate Governance: An essential Guide to South African Companies 2ed 
(2009) 11. 












of good governance codes which has created doubts in the minds of various 
stakeholders as to the efficacy of such codes.5 
Corporate governance legislation has gained worldwide application 
meaning that the various hurdles and barriers continue being experienced 
cannot be isolated to one particular jurisdiction. Despite the many 
challenges faced, the concept of corporate governance is now seen to cut 
across all the sectors of business and as such it is essential that its 
application should be spread across these sectors without discrimination. 
Against this background, it is justifiable and timely to conduct this research 
in order to pin point where the major problems lie and at the same time 
improve on the successes that have been scored.6 
 
1.1 Statement of problem 
Corporate governance has become so appealing in nature that almost every 
entity in the world strives to be associated with some if not all of the 
principles of good governance. Some situations demand the mandatory 
application of these principles whist in most cases, entities are encouraged 
to adopt these principles and bring their internal structures and systems to 
conform to corporate governance.7 Therefore, it is difficult to detach a 
company’s operations from the principles of good corporate governance. 
Despite the popularisation of corporate governance in most jurisdictions of 
the world, it is difficult to measure with certainty the levels of progress and 
challenges being faced due to the diverse nature of its application from one 
jurisdiction to another.8 It against this background that this paper 
endeavours to take a critical look at the origins of South Africa’s corporate 
governance structures, their current positions on the international scale and 
the course it is taking for the future. It is from this view that the various 
developments and hurdles affecting corporate governance need to be 
                                                          
5 Ramani Naidoo (note 3) 3. 
6 Brian Coyle (note 2) 5. 
7 This is the approach that was adopted by the King III report. 












ascertained in order to weigh how much progress has been achieved and the 
obstacles that have been faced since 1994 when the first King report was 
published to date. It is worth noting that 18 years have passed since 
corporate governance was first introduced in South Africa and this makes it 
timely to critically look at the entire system in order to judge its overall 
performance. 
 
1.2 Objectives and value 
The importance of this paper lies in the fact that this area of study has not 
received much attention and is rarely investigated by many scholars. It is 
therefore crucial to evaluate the various aspects of a company’s existence in 
order to take stock of the gains and losses suffered in the area of corporate 
governance with the ultimate aim of making a meaningful contribution to 
the effectiveness and efficiency of corporate governance systems in South 
Africa. Furthermore, this dissertation takes a comparative approach of some 
of the major corporate governance economies with the existing South African 
framework with the intention of providing some insight into areas that still 
require major reconstruction and how other jurisdictions have dealt with 
this area of study. 
 
1.3 Defining corporate governance 
Over the last 10 years corporate governance has continued to grow from 
strength to strength and its importance transcends the political, social and 
economic life of companies. It is a concept that continues to change with 
time and responds to various social, political and economic stimuli.9 Various 
commentators have continued to describe corporate governance as a term 
that is devoid of an exact definition, ‘something –like love and happiness’- of 
which the essential nature is known, but the difficulty comes in clothing it 
                                                          












with the precise words which can give it an accurate definition.10 As a result, 
its definition posse’s great challenges in that it is difficult to set its exact 
boundaries and have a globally accepted definition. Generally, corporate 
governance is defined as ‘the appropriate board structures, processes and 
values to cope with the rapidly changing demands of both shareholders in 
and around their enterprises.’11 
 However, for the purposes of this dissertation, the definition of 
corporate governance offered by Ramani Naidoo will be adopted as the 
working definition as it provides as follows: 
Corporate governance regulates the exercise of power (that is, authority, 
direct and control) within a company in order to ensure that the company’s 
purpose is achieved (namely the creation of sustainable shareholder value, 
the raison d etre of most for-profit companies)….the practice by which 
companies are managed and controlled.12 
The above definition seems to be definitive in nature and satisfies 
South Africa’s corporate governance needs in that it encompasses the 
various aspect of corporate governance.13 It must be noted that other 
definitions of corporate governance have not completely departed from the 
above working definition as they tend to show various similarities in various 
aspects. For instance Jean Jacques Du plessis et al defines corporate 
governance as follows: 
The system of regulation and overseeing corporate conduct and balancing 
the interests of all internal stakeholders and other parties (external 
stakeholders, governments and local communities) who can be affected by 
the corporation’s conduct, in order to ensure responsible behaviour by 
corporations and to achieve the maximum level of efficiency and profitability 
for a corporation.14 
Therefore, what comes out clearly from the above definitions is that 
corporate governance is concerned with the manner in which a company is 
controlled and most importantly to what end. It emphasises sustainability of 
                                                          
10 Jean Du Plessis et al Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance (2011) 3. 
11 Bob Garratt Thin on Top: Why Corporate governance matters and how to measure, manage 
and improve board performance (2003) 12. 
12 Ramani Naidoo (note 3) 3. 
13 These areas include checks and balances on the exercise of powers, compliance with legal 
and regulatory regimes, risk management and accountability. 












a corporation as a viable entity whilst at the same time sustaining the 
environment within which it operates. 
 
1.4 Principles of good corporate governance 
The term corporate governance is commonly used in the day to day activities 
in the corporate world however; as has been earlier mentioned the difficult 
part comes in dressing the term with a clear cut definition. Despite the 
differences in definitions, corporate governance possesses standard canons 
that do not change and have uniform application everywhere in the world. 
For instance, all shareholders should be treated equally whether they are 
minority or majority shareholders.15 The board of directors is given the 
enormous task of acting on behalf of the company whilst at the same time 
being answerable to the various shareholders for their deeds.16 In order to 
conform to the tenets of good corporate governance the tasks carried out by 
the board should be done in an open manner so as to ensure that 
information is disseminated clearly to the public and the various 
stakeholders thereby ensuring transparency of the entire process.17 
Therefore, in ensuring that most entities entrench corporate governance 
principles, the board of directors should act fairly and remain accountable 
to the stakeholders’ whist being responsible for their actions which should 
be done in a transparent manner.18 
 
1.5 Chapter outline 
Chapter two of this dissertation will discuss the legal basis of corporate 
governance and compliance. In order to achieve this objective, this chapter 
will be divided into two parts. The first part will deal with the regulatory 
                                                          
15 This is clearly exhibited by Section 62 of the Companies Act which provide for each 
shareholder to receive a notice of a meeting without giving special preference to majority 
shareholders. 














framework of corporate governance in South Africa paying particular 
attention to the statutory structure, codes of corporate governance and the 
principles of good practice. This part section will bring out the hybrid nature 
of the South African corporate governance framework. The second part will 
deal with the link between corporate governance and the law. It shall be 
acknowledged that breach of a responsibility or fiduciary duty has the 
consequence of attracting liability and the sanctions are clearly provided by 
the law. 
Chapter three will start by examining some of the major changes that 
were made from the king II report to the King III report. This will be achieved 
by taking a critical look at the particular aspects of the king III report that 
are distinct and stand out in the promotion of corporate governance. In 
essence this chapter will not look at all of the changes that where made but 
will mainly concentrate on the salient changes that were made. With regards 
to the comparative aspects, the dissertation will outline some of the 
progresses scored in the area of corporate governance in different 
jurisdictions, specifically England and USA will drawn, which will be 
compared with those achieved in South Africa. 
Chapter four of this paper will focus on the various challenges and 
obstacles that have been faced in the implementation and enforcement of 
corporate governance in South Africa. Comparative aspects will be made 
with other jurisdictions in order to achieve the objectives of this chapter. 
Chapter five is the concluding part which sums up the entire 
dissertation and makes various recommendations on how to overcome some 
of the challenges identified with the aim of improving corporate governance 

















LEGAL BASIS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND COMPLIANCE  
2.0 Introduction 
A company is created by the law therefore; its survival is dependent on the 
various governance structures that have been established by law. It is 
against this background that chapter two of this dissertation will endeavour 
to discuss the legal basis of corporate governance and compliance from the 
South African context. The first part will discuss the established corporate 
governance structures that are in place with emphasis on the main piece of 
legislation being the Companies Act of 2008.19 Thereafter, the need to 
regulate corporate governance will be looked into and how the codes of best 
practice form part of the whole matrix. The second part of this chapter will 
deal with correlation between the law and corporate governance bearing in 
mind the various corporate responsibilities and duties that the law creates. 
 
2.1 Regulatory framework of corporate governance in South Africa 
Corporate governance is a contemporary area of company law that provides 
a practical lens that can be used to test the various legal and regulatory 
structures in the e vironment within which a company exists and carries 
out its operations. It must be mentioned that corporate governance 
legislation will vary from one jurisdiction to another and as such the efficacy 
of the various governance structures will to a large extent depend on the 
legislation that is in place. According John Folson: 
Over the past twenty years, corporate governance has seen a surge in 
interest with regard to corporate responsibilities to society. Often these 
interests have not been embedded in statutes but instead have been 
implemented through guidelines and codes. The companies Act directly 
provides clear framework for the empowerment of stakeholders and includes 
a directive that companies operate to enhance not only shareholder profits 
                                                          
19 Act number 71 of 2008 was enacted on the 31st of March 2010 and will herein after be 












but also social welfare. To ensure that these purposes are fulfilled, the South 
African Government is [has] provided greater power in governance decisions 
than is typically found in most general corporate statutes.20 
Therefore, the above quote seems to suggest that enactment of the 
Companies Act has seen the implant of classical corporate regulation into 
the South African economy which has considerably raised the bar in the 
conditions for doing business while at the same time immensely fortifying 
the social and economic aims of the company.21  
The growth of corporate governance in most major economies of the 
world has see the establishment of various legal and regulatory regimes 
which are aimed at controlling, supervising and managing how corporations 
are governed. In essence, the effectiveness of these governance frameworks 
will to a large extent be dependent on the potency in the operations of these 
established structures.22 In South Africa, there is no single piece of 
legislation that can be singled out as being solely responsible for the 
regulation of corporate governance in that it tends to draw from numerous 
sources such as the various pieces of legislation23, the regulations that are 
passed to supplement the enabling Act, listing requirements for those 
companies that are listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange24 and the 
codes of best practice that seek to move with the ongoing trends of corporate 
governance on the international scene.25 Therefore, the interaction and 
interdependence between the various pieces of legislation, regulations and 
codes of best practice in performing the regulatory functions of corporate 
governance has proved to be appropriate in the context of South Africa’s 
company law in that this amalgamation has led to the growth and 
recognition of a hybrid system of regulation that is appropriately placed for 
the emerging South African economic needs. In addition to the law playing 
an integral part in navigation the course that a company’s operations will 
                                                          
20 John Folson ‘South Africa moves to a global model of corporate governance but with 
important national variations’ in Mongalo H Tshepo (ed) Modern Company Law for a 
Competitive South African Economy (2010) 219-247. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ramani Naidoo (note 3) 27. 
23 The Companies Act being at the apex of them all. 
24 Herein after referred to as JSE. 












take, the memorandum of incorporation26 spells out in clear terms the 
powers that a company can exercise by setting the limits and boundaries 
within which it may operate. This position has been clearly illustrated by 
section 15 of the Companies Act which provides that: 
15 (2) The Memorandum of Incorporation of any company may— 
(a) include any provision— 
(iii) imposing on the company a higher standard, greater restriction, longer 
period of time or any similarly more onerous requirement, than would 
otherwise apply to the company… 
(b) contain any restrictive conditions applicable to the company, and any 
requirement for the amendment of any such condition… 
(3) Except to the extent that a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation 
provides otherwise, the board of the company may make, amend or repeal 
any necessary or incidental rules relating to the governance of the company 
in respect of matters that are not addressed in this Act or the Memorandum 
of Incorporation.27 
Therefore, from the above provision it clear to see that the 
memorandum of incorporation is a vehicle that is used in the interaction of 
the various duties and responsibilities of directors, shareholders and other 
parties who exist within and outside the company. In essence when dealing 
with corporate governance regulation, the important role played by the 
memorandum of incorporation cannot be overlooked in that it is not possible 
to delink it from the hybrid regulatory chain that exists. 
The Companies Act plays a pivotal role as corporate governance 
legislation in that it provides for the birth, creation of various types of 
companies and defines the assortment of right and obligations that will flow 
from the company’s corporate nature as a separate legal entity. In an effort 
to enhance corporate governance, the Companies Act goes a step further in 
                                                          
26 This is the constituting document of the company. This is a document that can be 
couched in the standard form or in can be tailored according to the company’s needs. 
Furthermore, it may contain provisions that are not encompassed by the Act and it may 
modify those provisions that may not be altered. 












specifying the various offences that can be committed by the company and 
its prescribed officers and the penalties that will attach to such offences.28  
In order to have sound corporate governance structures, a number of 
principles will have to be enshrined in legislation. The Companies Act clearly 
spells out these principles as it provides for responsibility, accountability 
and transparency which cannot be unhinged from one another due to the 
interdependent roles they play in enhancing good corporate governance. For 
instance, the principle of responsibility comes out clearly when the Act 
provides that all the matters or business of the company will be taken care 
of by the board of directors.29 This is an onerous task which if not properly 
handled, might have adverse effects on the company’s operations and 
productivity. However, the Companies Act steps in to allay these concerns 
by allowing for the creation of committees whose main objective will be to 
assist the board of directors in carrying out their obligations. Section 72 of 
the companies Act provides as follows: 
72(1) Except to the extent that the Memorandum of Incorporation of a 
company provides otherwise, the board of a company may— 
(a) appoint any number of committees of directors; and 
(b) delegate to any committee any of the authority of the board.30 
The fact that the above provision empowers the board of directors to 
delegate its jurisdiction to the committees, neither means that it has 
renounced it fiduciary duties to these committees nor does it have the effect 
of watering down or diminishing the said fiduciary duties. This position is 
fortified by the King III report which provides that ‘the board should delegate 
certain functions to well established committees but without abdicating its 
own responsibility.’31  
 
                                                          
28 Section 77 attaches liability on directors and prescribed officers while Chapter 9 of the 
Act provides for the various offences and penalties. 
29 Section 66. 
30 Section 72. 
31 The King Code of Governance Principles (King III report) Principle 2.23 available at 












2.1.1 Creation of Committees vis-à-vis corporate governance 
It is worth noting that the creation of committees is a clear manifestation of 
the efficacy of good corporate governance in that the various roles and 
responsibilities played by the board will be complimented by the various 
committees thereby ensuring that the company achieves its maximum 
productivity whilst at the same time ensuring that the company is run 
ethically and effectively. 
 
(a) Audit Committee 
Every company should strive to have in place an independent audit working 
group that effectively carries out its functions.32 This committee seems to 
settle in well with good corporate governance principles in that the 
individuals who compose it will be independent and sufficiently specialised 
to carry out audit functions. Of course it goes without saying that one of the 
major challenges faced with the principle of accountability is when it comes 
to settling on how the director’s will be made accountable and over what 
period of time. The Act provides a solution to this problem in that a 
company will be required to have its annual financial statements audited 
every year.33 In addition, King III further makes provision for the audit 
committee to convene as frequently as two times in a financial year for the 
purpose of supervising the integrated reporting.34 From the above it is clear 
to see that the Act is not only riddled with various principles of good 




                                                          
32 Ibid Principle 3.1.1 makes it mandatory for all companies that are either owned by the 
state or are listed on the JSE to have established audit committees while it is highly 
recommended for all other Companies. 
33 Section 84 which will be presented at the company’s Annual General Meeting. 












(b) Risk Committee 
The management of a company is vested with the board of directors and as 
such a corollary of this responsibility is the taking of risks for the purpose of 
ensuring that the company is productive and remains profitable. The risk 
committee plays an integral part in the risk management process of any 
organisation as it is specifically appointed for the purpose of assisting the 
board in carrying out its responsibilities that relate to risk.35 In essence, the 
management of risk is vital to good corporate governance in that it will 
ensure the growth and sustainability of the company by identifying risks 
through a logical process of decision making, gauging the value of risk and 
adequately diminishing or eliminating the risk.36 
It is worthy of note that the audit and risk committees are not the only 
committees that are provided for as there are other committees such as the 
remuneration committee which will look into the remuneration policies of 
the company by outlining the various remuneration packages and ensuring 
that directors are fairly awarded.37 Additionally, the nomination committee 
will be tasked with the responsibility of advising the board as to the 
appropriate candidates to be appointed as directors of the company.38 
 
2.1.2 Why is regulation necessary? 
One of the main objectives of the company is to provide a conducive 
regulatory environment that is predictable and productive to the company’s 
needs.39 Primarily, regulations are required for the purpose of rectifying or 
correcting imperfections that may exist within the enabling act or the 
environment within which the company operates. Professor Ballantine, a 
Californian legislative drafter in the 1930s had this to say: 
                                                          
35 King III (note 31) Principle 4.3. 
36 Greenfield Michael Risk Management: “Risk as a Resource” Virginia: Langley Research 
Centre available on http://www.mightystudents.com/essay/Risk.Management.essay.97765 
[accessed on 8th October 2012]. 
37 King III (note 31) Report Principle 2.25.2. 
38 Ibid Principle 2.19.1. 












The primary purpose of corporation law is not regulatory. They are enabling 
Acts, to authorise businessmen to organise and operate their business, large 
or small, with the advantage of corporate mechanism. They are drawn with 
the view to facilitate management of business and adjustment to the needs 
of change.40 
Against this background, it can be said that the Act enables and 
authorises the creation of companies while the various pieces of regulations 
will be drawn up for the purpose of assisting the enabling Act. In essence, 
there are various changes that will occur in the environment within which 
the company operates, as such in order for the existing legal framework to 
easily and quickly adopt or adjust to these needs; various regulations will 
need to be in place to assist the law to move with the winds of change.41 The 
Companies Act mandates various agencies and regulatory bodies to pass 
regulations which are aimed at assisting the operation of companies and 
protecting the interests of various investing parties.42 These regulatory 
bodies include the takeover regulation panel, the competition commission 
and the Securities and Exchange Commission.43The states’ right to regulate 
corporate behaviour is clearly exercised through regulations. 
 
2.1.3 The role played by the S ock market in Corporate Governance. 
With the growth of international trade and commerce, most countries in the 
world have well established stock markets which are regulated by rules of 
conduct for those companies which may wish to trade their shares on the 
stock exchange. Various market forces have been seen to play a pivotal role 
in the enforcement of corporate governance in that these principles are not 
codified by statutory law but draw their efficacy from customs of trade. In 
South Africa, the JSE holds the exchange licence in terms of the Securities 
Services Act.44 This entails that any company that has a desire to trade its 
shares on the JSE would have to apply to be listed in addition to complying 
                                                          
40 Jane Dine The Governance of Corporate Groups (2000) 11. 
41 Ramani Naidoo (note 3) 28. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 












with the various rules and listing requirements45 before it can be allowed to 
list its shares on the stock market.46 The JSE is a highly organised system 
of trading in listed securities which in effect gives the trading public some 
sense of confidence to freely trade in the securities of such a company.47 It 
strives to uphold the tenets of good corporate governance principles in that 
the listing requirements are constantly reviewed and updated in order to be 
in line with the trends that emerge on the international markets. 
Furthermore, the importance that is attached to the JSE listing 
requirements is seen through the punishment that follows directors who will 
be held liable in their individual capacity or by virtue of their position as 
directors for not complying with the said listing conditions.48 To some 
extent, the JSE listing requirements seems to act as a harmonising factor in 
terms of the various corporate governance principles and international 
practices. 
 
2.1.4 Codes of best practices 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the need to have good corporate 
governance principles in place was first observed in the UK due to the 
financial meltdown which was suffered by major multinational corporations 
such as the Maxwell group of companies. This situation has given impetus 
to the growth of corporate governance which has seen an overhaul of 
corporate and securities legislations of most emerging economies thereby 
formulating a more transparent and adjustable system. The UK being the 
leading proponent of corporate governance in the world saw the publication 
                                                          
45 These requirements are stricter, more demanding and require more extensive duties of 
disclosure of certain information.  
46 JSE Listing Requirements (2003) Listing Requirement 1.2 available at 
https://www.jse.co.za/...JSE_-_Listings_Requirements/service_issue_1 [accessed on 23rd 
October 2012]. 
47 Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 2ed (2011) 76. 












of the Cadbury Report in 1992 which was reported as being ‘a landmark in 
thinking on Corporate Governance.’49 
In 1994 South African was not excluded as it responded favourably to 
these emerging trends that were being experienced on the international 
scene in the area of corporate governance. It is against this backdrop that 
the Institute of Directors were stimulated to publish the King I report which 
was the first ever corporate governance code. This report was revised in 
2004 which saw the publication of the King II report and a further revision 
was made to King II in 2009 which saw the birth of the King III report that is 
currently being used. The King III report was published as a response to the 
new Companies Legislation.50  
In many parts of the world, most corporate governance codes are 
modelled either on the basis of a shareholder approach or an enlightened 
shareholder approach to corporate governance.51 However, the South 
African code of corporate governance departed from this conventional but 
yet prescriptive mode by adopting an entirely new and unique mode that 
stands out amongst most corporate governance codes in the world. The 
distinction of this code lies in the fact that it is based on an all inclusive 
stakeholder approach which will not only consider the interests of the 
shareholders but will seek to strike a balance between the interests of all the 
concerned stake holders of the company. This approach has proven to be 
conducive and favourable to the needs of the South African emerging 
economy.52 
The codes of best practice that exist in most jurisdictions are 
voluntary in nature in that companies will be encouraged to apply and adopt 
the said codes voluntarily. However, although the codes maybe voluntary in 
nature, they are made to apply mandatorily to companies that are listed on 
the stock exchange in addition to the various other stringent rules which are 
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set out by the listing authorities.53 Compliance in the South African context 
connotes that the company should be able to furnish all the necessary 
documentation that will show the extent to which the codes and guidelines 
are being applied. In an event that the company fails or diverts from 
applying the code, a written explanation that states the reasons for such a 
diversion will amount to compliance.54The world over, hybrid systems of 
corporate governance are emerging resulting in most aspects of corporate 
governance being legislated of course this is in addition to the various 
voluntary codes of governance and principles which are already in place. 
The hybrid nature of corporate governance is seen clearly in the companies 
Act which derived various principles of good governance from the 
recommendations that were made in the King II report and some from 
common law thereby resulting into a formidable corporate legislation that 
strives to meet society’s needs.55 In addition the JSE listing requirements 
also plays its part by ensuring the independence of directors and provides a 
clear distinction between the roles of the chief executive officer and the 
chairman of the board.56Therefore, the development of corporate governance 
codes of practice is as a result of consented efforts by various countries and 
various other interested players in the corporate world.57 
 
2.2 Interconnection between corporate governance and the law 
The law is a golden thread that runs through every aspect of a company’s 
existence and as such corporate governance will not be exempted or 
immune from associating with it. A company is a creation of statute 
accordingly; all of its dealings and operations will be regulated on one hand 
by the law and on the other hand by the memorandum of incorporation 
                                                          
53 Brian Coyle (note 2) 36. 
54 This is what is referred to as the ‘apply or explain’ doctrine. 
55 Ramani Naidoo (note 3) 29. 
56 Guide to the JSE Listing Requirements: The Boardroom Brief Series (June 2003) 9 available 
at https://www.deloitte.com/assets/.../JSE%20Listings%20Requirements.pdf [accessed on 
28th October 2012]. 
57 Some of these players include the stock exchange, investors, and associations of directors 












document. A consequence that flows from this is that corporate governance 
cannot exist in a vacuum as its sustainability will greatly depend on the law 
which creates an inseparable bond between the two aspects.  
The fact that corporate governance deals with the way in which a 
company’s affairs are governed entails that the responsibility to perform this 
momentous task is placed squarely on the shoulders of the directors of the 
company who will be required safeguard the rights and address the various 
concerns of the stakeholders whilst at the same time being answerable to 
the company’s shareholders.58 This position seems to be a clear justification 
as to why companies should be regulated by the law in addition to 
complying with the established codes of best practice. Furthermore, the 
nexus between corporate governance and the law tends to come out 
prominently in the established structures and processes of the company 
which are absorbed in the corporate governance function for the purpose of 
ensuring that appropriate checks and balances are in place. This 
interconnection is a safeguard that insulates the company from 
mismanagement which may be occasioned by the directors. In essence the 
connection will ensure that directors carry out their duties and 
responsibilities in line with the guidelines set by the law.59 The courts have 
not taken a leading role in en uring that corporate governance principles are 
enforced owing to the fact that it is an area of the law that is fairly novel and 
has not seen a lot of litigation in the recent past. However, as corporate 
governance continues to gain ground around in most parts of the world, the 
courts’ involvement in settling disputes that arise out of corporate 
governance issues is definitely set to increase. This position has been 
fortified by King III report which provides that ‘the more established certain 
governance principles become. The more likely, the court would regard 
conduct that conforms with [to] these practices as meeting the required 
standard of care.’60 Therefore in addition to the standard of conduct that has 
been set by the companies Act and the common law, corporate governance 
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In conclusion, this chapter has demonstrated that the regulation of 
corporate governance in South Africa does not emanate from a vacuum nor 
is it confined to only one piece of legislation but it is drawn from various 
sources. It has further been seen that the effectiveness of corporate 
governance in any environment will largely depend on the legal structures 
that are currently in place in that jurisdiction. In essence the principles of 
corporate governance cannot be delinked form the law as the two go hand in 
hand in that corporate law creates various corporate structures and allows 
for the creation of various legal relationships between various competing 
interests. It is my view that the law just like corporate governance impacts 
positively on various aspects of human life such as social, economic, 



























EVOLUTION FROM KING II TO KING III: DEVELOPMENTS AND GAINS 
 ‘The release of King III is a useful addition South Africa’s corporate governance 
livery and its more flexible “apply and explain” approach is to be welcomed. In 
most areas, King III represents a major improvement over its predecessor. In 
other areas, it is hoped that practice notes will be issued to resolve confusion 
about the practical application of some of its principles.’  Ramani Naidoo62 
 
3.0 Introduction 
The first part of this chapter creates the case for corporate governance by 
giving a background of some of the factors that have acted as catalysts to its 
growth and development all around the world. The second part goes on to 
discuss some of the notable changes that have been made from King II to 
King III bearing in mind that these are not the only changes that were made. 
The third part of this chapter compares the progresses and successes that 
have been registered between South Africa and the International world 
whilst the final part will draw a conclusion of this chapter. 
 
3.1 Case for corporate governance 
The existence of a good corporate governance regime is an issue that 
continues to raise great concern all around the world and is relentlessly 
gaining more ground with the passing of each year. Various stakeholders 
have risen up and made their voices heard by calling for companies to 
exhibit corporate governance at the highest levels through transparency and 
reporting. The impetus of such requirements was due to the financial 
scandals that rocked the United Kingdom in the early 1990’s.63 The famous 
Maxwell Saga is notably one of the greatest financial scandals of all times. 
Robert Maxwell who was at the helm of the Maxwell group of companies 
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devised a dangerous scheme of playing ‘Russian Roulette’ with the 
subsidiaries and various assets of his group of companies around the world 
which made it very difficult and almost impossible to ascertain the 
profitability of the said subsidiaries. His scheming nature and trickery way 
of conducting his businesses infiltrated the United States stock exchange 
market with so much ease where he made billions of dollars through the 
sale of shares which were far less than their net worth.64 Such financial 
manipulation of the stock market was attributed to the existing porous laws 
that allowed foreign companies to trade in their shares without being 
subjected to stringent disclosure rules and procedures.65  The justification 
in placing greater emphasis on transparency in corporate governance and 
uplifting the reporting standards has been due to the continued collapse of 
dominant companies in the market and has been summed up as follows: 
‘such lapses in corporate governance have uplifted the need for independent 
audits, independent opinions and independent ratings on corporate 
governance principles and processes within companies.’66 
Therefore in response to the various concerns that had been raised in 
the UK, the Cadbury report was first published in 1992 which was seen as a 
landmark corporate governance regime.67 In this vein, the UK has risen to 
the status of pioneering the growth of corporate governance structures 
around the world as various countries use it as a bench mark to record 
corresponding developments.68 The existing corporate governance 
framework in the United Kingdom has experienced extraordinary 
movements and changes which have seen over six working groups being 
instituted between 1992 and 2010.69 From this, a perception can be drawn 
                                                          
64 Market watch ‘Maxwell Saga bad accounting aided fraud’ available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/08/business/market [Accessed on 5th October 2012]. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Understanding Governance available at https://www.docstoc.com [Accessed on 12th 
November 2012]. 
67 Championed by Lord Cadbury (the report included a code of best practices known as the 
Cadbury code). 
68 Brian Coyle (note 2) 36. 
69 Which include Cadbury report 1992, Myners Report 1995, Greenbury 1995(remuneration 
of directors), Hampel Committee 1998 (composition of the board and role of directors), 
combined code on corporate governance 1998 (listed companies), Higgs Report 2003 (role of 












to some extent that the UK is still trying to find its proper footing in the 
realm of corporate governance but this is a matter which is open to further 
debate.  
In 1992, South Africa stepped up to the challenge by establishing a 
working group called the King Committee70 which was headed by retired 
Judge Mervin King. The terms of reference of this committee were to 
consider various issues pertaining to the promotion of corporate governance 
systems and structures in South Africa. Naidoo seems to put this into 
perspective when she says that: 
…the King committee was formed…to consider amongst other issues of 
financial reporting and accountability, good governance practice concerning 
the responsibilities of directors and auditors and a code of ethical conduct 
for south African enterprises.71 
In essence the King committee was vested with the mammoth task of 
nurturing and guiding the growth of corporate governance from one stage to 
another and ensuring that this growth was from strength to strength. This 
can be clearly seen from the expansive nature in which the terms of 
reference were drafted. The authoritative nature of the King committee can 
be clearly seen through the confidence that has been vested in this group to 
produce three consecutive reports and the subsequent enactment of the 
Companies Act in 2008. Throughout the world, South Africa is being used 
as a model of strong and stable good corporate governance principles 
because its development has been marshalled by only one committee which 
has provided for continuity thereby giving the committee a greater depth of 
understanding of the needs of society from one report to the next whilst at 
the same time gaining the public’s confidence.72 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(FRC) for guidance for audit committee, Revised combined code 2010 (UK corporate 
governance code). 
70 Instituted under the auspices of the South African Institute of Directors (IoD). 
71 Ramani Naidoo (note 3) 32. 
72 King committee has controlled the process of putting in place a corporate governance 












3.2 The salient changes from King II to King III 
Various changes have been recorded from King II to King III, however this 
dissertation will place emphasis on the most important and noticeable 
changes that were made. 
 
3.2.1 Inclusive stakeholder relationships 
During the apartheid era, various sanctions were imposed on South Africa 
that resulted in the country being secluded from taking part in various 
issues on the international scene. With the advent of democracy in 1991, 
South Africa experienced a complete change in its political, social and 
economic sectors which was coupled with the re-entrance of the country on 
to the international corporate market and world economies.73 Paramount on 
the terms of reference of the first king report in 1994 was to advocate for the 
highest corporate governance standards in South Africa. King I not only 
emphasised final and regulatory elements of corporate governance but went 
a step further to promote an integrated procedure and techniques to 
achieving good governance bearing in mind the various stakeholders to 
corporate governance.74 Since 1994, the country has undergone a steady 
transformation in its political, social and economic environment which has 
seen the need to comprehensively revamp the existing corporate and 
securities legislatio  in order to create a more flexible and transparent 
regime for the various stakeholders which in turn made it necessary to 
update the King report.75 When drafting the King I report, the committee 
ascertained the duty for companies to admit that they share a special bond 
with both the society and the environment within which they perform their 
                                                          
73 King Committee on Corporate Governance: Executive Summary of the King Report (2002) 6 
available at 
https://www.library.ufs.ac.za/.../King%20II%20Report%20Exec%20summary.pdf [Accessed 
1st November 2012]. 
74 Mervyn King King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa available at 
https://www.mervynking.co.za/downloads/CD_King2.pdf [Accessed on 1st November 2012]. 












functions.76 This concept is what has become fondly referred to as the triple 
bottom line which has entrenched its roots firmly in most corporate 
governance codes of the world as it entails that a company should not only 
look at achieving the highest levels of profitability but instead try to achieve 
some form of equilibrium between the social, economic and environmental 
performance.77 The idea of the triple bottom line was given precedence in the 
King II report as being part of good corporate governance which provides 
that ‘there is a move from the single bottom line to the triple bottom, which 
embraces the economic, environmental and social aspects of the company’s 
activities.’78 This position was fortified by the King Committee which 
provided that: 
Successful governance in the world in the 21st century requires companies to 
adopt an inclusive and not exclusive approach. The company must be open 
to institutional activism and there must be greater emphasis on sustainable 
or non-financial aspects of its performance. Boards must apply the test of 
fairness accountability, responsibility and transparency to all acts or 
omissions and be accountable to the company but also responsive and 
responsible towards the company’s identified stakeholders. The correct 
balance between conformance with governance principles and performance 
in an entrepreneurial market economy must be found but will be specific to 
each company.79 
King I and II emphasised the need to have an all inclusive stakeholder 
approach. The King III report goes a step further and gives a detailed 
explanation of this approach in that a board of directors in carrying out 
their functions must give consideration to what is in the best interest of the 
company bearing in mind the various legitimate interests and anticipations 
of the stakeholders. This approach seeks to isolate the need to champion the 
interests of the shareholder at the expense of the best interests of the 
company and the various other players. For the first time governing 
stakeholder relationships have been given the prominence it deserves in the 
King III report which provides that: 
                                                          
76 King committee on Corporate governance (2002) 6 available at 
https://http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/executive_summary.pdf [Accessed on 18th 
October 2012]. 
77 John Folson (note 20) 222. 













8.3. The board should strive to achieve the appropriate balance between its 
various stakeholder groupings, in the best interests of the company 
8.3.1. The board should take account of the legitimate interests and 
expectations of its stakeholders in its decision-making in the 
best interests of the company.80 
 
3.2.2 Scope of application 
On one hand, the King II report was limited in its range of application as it 
only applied to companies that were listed on the JSE, Banks, Financial and 
Insurance bodies and public sector entities and agencies that where 
operating under the umbrella of the Public Finance Management Act.81 On 
the other hand, companies that were not covered by this umbrella were 
advised to contemplate applying the code in relation to the various corporate 
governance principles whilst at the same time the various stakeholders were 
encouraged to observe how companies where applying the various principles 
laid down by the code.82 King III report has cast the net wider than its 
predecessor in that it captures all the companies regardless of their 
character, size and manner in which it has been formed. This position was 
fortified by the King committee which provides that  
We have drafted the principles so that every entity can apply them and in so 
doing achieve good governance. All entities should apply the principles in the 
code and consider the best practice recommendations of the report. All 
entities should by way of explanation make a positive statement about how 
the principles have applied or have not been applied. This… will allow 
stakeholders to comment…on the quality of …governance.’83 
In essence, the corporate governance principles enshrined in the King 
III report are drafted in such a fashion that enables an entity to be deemed 
                                                          
80 King III (note 31) principle 8.3. 
81 The King Code of Governance Principles (2002) principle 1.1 available at 
http://www.icsaglobal.com/assets/files/pdfs/BusinessPractice_and_IQS_docs/studytexts/
corporategovernance2/w_CorpGov_6thEd_StudyText_Appendix4.pdf [Accessed on 13th 
November 2012]. 
82 Ibid principle 1.2. 
83 IoD King Code of Governance for South Africa KING III (2009) 33 available at 













as having complied with the principles if it explains how certain principles 
have been applied. 
The JSE has embraced the King III report as being an integral part of 
its listing requirements. This imposes a mandatory application of all areas of 
the King report on all those companies that are listed on the JSE failure to 
do so such companies must explain why the King report has not been 
applied in their annual reports and accounts.84  Therefore, a company’s 
stakeholders are placed in a position of making the final call in terms of 
being compliance officers tasked with the responsibility of informing the 
board whether or not the recommended practices are being observed. 
 
3.2.3 Integrated reporting and disclosure 
Another notable distinction between King II and King III is that King II 
demanded companies implement sustainability reporting as a major feature 
of corporate governance. Ever since 2002 when the second edition of the 
King report was published, South Africa as a country has grown from 
strength to strength as an emerging market economy which in turn has had 
the ripple effect of making sustainability reporting as a pre-requisite to good 
corporate governance. Coupled with this economic growth has been the 
continued mistrust of major companies by society which questions the 
intentions and business practices of these companies. In addition the 
efficiency of sustainability reporting had continued to raise serious concerns 
among various players of corporate governance in that it did not meet their 
expectations and was viewed as not being cost effective.85 These and other 
concerns have been very persuasive in moving entities to report not only on 
their total performance into a uniquely novel era of reporting in corporate 
governance in that the old type of reporting which placed primary focus on 
                                                          
84 JSE LISTING REQUIREMENT 3.84 available at https://www.jse.co.za/...JSE_-
_Listings_Requirements/service_issue_1. [Accessed on 23rd October 2012]. 
85 King unveils world first integrated reporting guidelines 25th July 2011 available at 













financial information was inadequate to satisfy the desires of the various 
stakeholders and shareholders included.86 These views expressed the need 
to revamp and revitalise sustainability reporting. It is against this 
background that King stated: 
An integrated report is not simply bolting the sustainability report to the 
financial report. It incorporates, in clear language, material information from 
these and other sources to enable stakeholders to evaluate an organisations 
performance and to make an informed assessment about its ability to create 
and sustain value.87 
Therefore a major achievement that has been scored by King III was to 
go a step further than just sustainability reporting but to place emphasis on 
the annual integrated report that takes a bird’s eye view of the effects that a 
company is likely to have on the social, environmental and economic 
fronts.88 
 
3.2.4 Risk management 
The area of risk management has received more attention in King III as 
opposed to King II. The South African economy, like most of the world’s 
major economies, has seen the need to manage risk associated with doing 
business as this has been identified as an important aspect of any 
company’s existence in that it is an area that requires a pragmatic approach 
in trying to alleviate such risks. As a result, this has transpired in 
approaching risk from a systematic and more integrated view thereby 
transforming risk associated with doing business into an opportunity.89 King 
III stepped up and apportioned the daunting task managing risk to the 
board of directors who should have in mind the risk associated with the 
various strategies and policies which they are about to implement 
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furtherance of the company’s objectives. This position has been fortified by 
Naidoo who adds that: 
The board’s role in the control of risk has increased greatly in King III. The 
board is responsible for risk governance while management is responsible for 
risk management strategy approved by the board. The board therefore is 
responsible for the overall efficiency of risk management, although 
management remains responsible for implementation.90 
Therefore, King III attaches great importance to the management of 
risk because it has become apparent that in order for a company to achieve 
its long term objectives whilst remaining sustainable as a viable entity, the 
taking of risks will be inevitable. This justifies the need to harness and 
manage risk at a higher level such as codifying it in the corporate 
governance code as a principle of good corporate governance. 
 
3.2.5 Information technology 
Information technology has been viewed as the driving force behind the 
industrial revolution thus cannot be unhinged from the concept of good 
corporate governance as it provides the much needed value addition to 
promote corporate governance. IT is seen as a mechanism that strives to 
promote the various contributions of executives in the decision making 
process and adherence to the best practices.91 Furthermore, it is perceived 
as a factor that extends the intrinsic value of stimulating the interest of 
various decision makers by making full use of the prospects that are offered 
such as the internet and the market economies. This position has been 
fortified as follows: 
The affordance of information technology can empower executives to 
promote a participative and stakeholder welfare environment in decision 
making of corporate governance, where various stakeholders can be 
informed, participate to some level, and raise awareness of their best 
interests.92 
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Furthermore, in order for the board of directors to make informed 
decisions various pieces of information need to be computed and 
manipulated for that specific purpose. This will in turn lead to the creation 
of various data bases within the company structure that will assist in the 
detection of fraud in data of a corporate nature. 
The King committee realised the importance that information 
technology plays in the management of any entity and thus introduced a 
complete chapter on the management of Information technology in the third 
King report which was a novel feature. The extensive use of IT in the 
emerging market clearly justifies its inclusion in the report which has gone a 
step further to link it with the management of risk. As such the Board is 
vested with the responsibility of management of IT systems through the risk 
committee that should ensure the integrity of a company’s information and 
data whilst at the same time securing IT systems. Naidoo adds that ‘a 
framework that supports the effective management of information resources…to 
facilitate the achievement of corporate objectives. The focus on the measurement 
and management of IT are appropriately controlled.’93 
Therefore, a board must be able to make decisions that will in turn be 
effectively communicated to the various stakeholders; IT plays an integral 
part in corporate governance in that it extends the ambit of such 
communications beyond the visible boundaries and systems of 
corporations.94 
 
3.3 Overall progress from King II and beyond 
It is undisputable that corporate governance structures all over the world 
have undergone significant transformation. However, it must be noted that 
there is no hard and fast rule or empirical formula that can be used to 
gauge the progress and successes that have been scored in the area of 
corporate governance. Therefore this dissertation will seek to examine the 
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progress from a theoretical context by looking into the successes scored in 
the areas of the legal frameworks, implementation or enforcement, 
shareholder rights, disclosures and board of directors. 
 
3.3.1 Legal framework 
Massive reforms to corporate governance and corporate laws have been 
necessitated by the need to have in place a more market-driven governance 
system. In addition, ‘updates to the regulations and guidelines, listing 
requirements and corporate governance codes have been comprehensively 
revamped.’95 For instance, the UK has experienced a complete overhaul of 
its corporate and securities legislation into a regime that is more pliable and 
transparent for all the major stakeholders of the company. The UK’s 
Companies Act of 2006 has been said to be the most extensive and self 
contained piece of corporate legislation to have ever been promulgated by 
parliament as it seeks to promote among other things regulations that relate 
to auditing of financial statements with a view of achieving good corporate 
governance.96 The Act envisages the board to be at the top of the decision 
making process with their responsibilities formally cut out by the available 
governance structures. Furthermore, it acknowledges that the relationships 
between the shareholders, directors, management and other stakeholders 
are only stabilised where an effective governance structure is in place.97 
Therefore, the board should act in such a way that is most likely to promote 
the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole.98 A 
further gain that has been registered is through the United Kingdom Listing 
authority rules and transparency rules that incorporate various corporate 
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governance principles to be complied with by companies which are listed on 
the stock market.99 
A number of EU directives have also been promulgated by the 
European commission, with regards to corporate governance principles, in 
Brussels which are applicable to all EU member states.100 These directives 
impose strict requirements for companies to publish businesses for those 
companies that trade their shares on the regulated market. The directives 
impose further requirements to have in place audit committees and to 
establish measures that will ensure that these auditors operate 
independently with the highest levels of ethics.101 This is without a doubt a 
step in the right direction in promoting good corporate governance principles 
on the international scene. 
USA has not been left behind as its main achievement in the area of 
corporate governance was registered with the enactment of the Sarbanes –
Oxley Act102 which was in response to the major financial scandals that were 
being experienced between 2001 and 2002.103 The act applies to both US 
and Non US companies that have traded their shares on the US stock 
exchange. The SOX imposes personal liability on the CEO and Financial 
officers104 of a company for any inaccuracies that maybe recorded in the 
financial statements. The SOX acted as a cradle for corporate governance in 
that it provided for the promotion of whistle blowing function among several 
other corporate governance principles. The importance of this function was 
clearly manifested at Enron in 2001 when a whistle blower exposed the 
various glaring financial irregularities.105 The whistle blowing function has 
become a very effective corporate governance mechanism that is used to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
98 Companies Act 2006 (UK) section 172. 
99 Brian Coyle (note 2) 36. 
100 Directive 2009/102/EC of the European Parliament and Council of 16th September 2009 
in the area of company law available at https://eur-
lex.europa.ec/lexuriserve/LexUrisev.do?Uri=CELEX:32009L0102:EN:NOT [Accessed on 10th 
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expose the most flagrant breaches of corporate governance principles. A case 
in point relates to the story of Michael Woodford who was a former CEO of 
Olympus Corporation in Japan who discovered and blew the whistle about 
the various financial irregularities in the corporation. Despite being fired for 
going public with his findings, the rewards were greater as the board 
chairman together with two other executives were found guilty of offences 
relating to accounting fraud.106 
As a result of the political reforms that have been experienced in 
South Africa, various corporations inevitably had to be exposed to a different 
era of political management which in turn had a ripple effect on the market 
and regulatory system.107 South Africa as an emerging economy has been in 
a hurry to implement corporate governance principles which has resulted in 
major gains being recorded on a number of fronts and the major changes 
that have been experienced can be attributed to the road to democracy 
chosen by the country. It is worth noting that corporate governance 
frameworks vary from one jurisdiction to the next as the existence of such 
frameworks will largely depend on various factors that may be peculiar to 
such an economy. In South Africa, the market has been singled out as a 
major factor that has helped to shape the corporate governance regime. This 
position has been clearly fortified as follows 
Market discipline imposed through falling equity prices has led to radical 
changes in corporate governance structures and conduct, among others the 
dismantling of the mining finance houses. Undoubtedly one element of 
South Africans equity culture, widespread executive share compensation 
brought home the impact of market disenchantment. But the leading role 
was played by sovereign institutional investors who robustly criticised 
corporate structures, governance and performance upon their return to 
South African Markets in 1994.108 
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Therefore, it is clear from the above quotation that the conditions that 
are prevailing in the market have served as a catalyst for change in that it 
ties in with the legal framework in order to  make the South African market 
a conducive investment destination whilst at the same time creating a hub 
of good corporate governance. Progress in the area of legislative reform was 
scored with the promulgation of the Companies Act109 which has the 
promotion of corporate governance standards and transparency as one of its 
major highlights.110 The companies Act strives to promote corporate 
governance principles in that it provides the need for the accountability by 
the board of directors to the company’s shareholders and goes further to 
elevate transparency as a pre-requisite to good corporate governance.111 In 
addition the Act under section 159 has given birth to a full gamut of 
protection to any person who is classified and defined as a whistle blower. 
This provision is similar to the corporate governance feature that is greatly 
celebrated in the US SOX Act.  
In 2011 another major development was achieved with the 
promulgation of the Companies regulations which provided inter alia for the 
enhancement of accountability and transparency in terms of addressing the 
qualifications of the audit committee and the company secretary.112 The new 
regulations have resulted in palpable changes in the conduct of business in 
the market as they provide for the enhancement of various regulatory 
agencies coupled with various enforcement mechanisms such as Alternative 
Dispute Resolution, the complaints commission and the companies 
commission all of which have been classified as major progresses in the area 
of corporate governance in South Africa. 
Furthermore, the JSE listing requirements make it mandatory for all 
listed companies to apply the King III code and its principles. This 
requirement is also similar to that which exists in the UK Listing rules. 
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Therefore, some of South Africa’s backlogs in terms of the levels of 
disclosure as compared to the practices that are prevalent have been 
eliminated due to the enhanced Listing rules and accounting standards.113 It 
can thus be said that South Africa’s legislative framework has achieved 
tremendous progress and its stable nature has been attributed to the 
importation of various corporate governance principles from different 
jurisdictions in addition to the clear set of guidelines, recommendations and 
conditions by the King committee. 
 
3.3.2 Enforcement and strengthening institutional capacity 
Internationally, there has been increased enforcement capability in the area 
of corporate governance with most jurisdictions registering an increase in 
the creation of quasi-governmental institutions or bodies that operate 
separately with the sole purpose of implementing and supervising of 
corporate governance frameworks. Some of the notable examples ‘include 
the financial Reporting Council in Hong Kong China, Philippines Stock 
Exchange, an Enforcement division at the Bursa Malaysia and Audit 
oversight Boards in Korea and Malaysia.’114 
In the US, the SOX also has made efforts to strengthen the various 
private supervisory mechanisms ranging from company’s external auditors, 
audit committees, external counsel, market scrutinisers and not forgetting 
the whistle blowers who are seen as the ‘new kid’ on the corporate 
governance block. Therefore by strengthening the monitoring capacities of 
these various instruments, the Act is pursing the possibility of detecting 
illegal and inappropriate activities.115 
With the publication of the King II report on corporate governance in 
2002, South Africa has seen the strengthening of institutional capacities by 
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the introduction of various bodies that focus on re-enforcing the 
enforcement capabilities of the Act thereby enhancing good corporate 
governance principles. The companies commission is the body that plays a 
supervisory role in ensuring that the Act is complied with. Cassim et al 
fortify this position by adding that: 
Any person including stakeholders ranging from the company secretary, 
shareholders, directors, trade unions or employee representatives may lodge 
complaints with the Companies Commission, the companies commission 
may also act on its own initiative [as] it may investigate alleged 
contraventions of the act and may appoint an investigator or inspector to 
investigate the complaint.116 
In the US, the Sarbanes –Oxley Act which was enacted after the Enron 
scandal in 2002 imposes stiff criminal sanctions on directors of a company 
for any business transactions that may be perceived as being 
questionable.117 The SOX Act has increased criminal penalties imposed on 
the Chief Executive officer and financial officer for any inaccuracies in the 
financial statements on the company thereby making these officers 
personally liable in addition to any other civil liabilities that may be 
attached.118 
The South African Companies Act has moved from an extensive highly 
criminalised Act to a more flexible and decriminalised Companies Act. The 
Act is not completely devoid of any criminal sanction in that these seem to 
be specifically reserved for grave offences and contravention of the Act. 
Cassim et al adds that ‘the object of decriminalising company law is not to 
trivialise the importance of effective sanctions for non-compliance but 
instead to ensure more effective enforcement.’119 Therefore the main aim is 
to reduce criminal sanctions but instead rely more on non-criminal 
remedies such as administrative fines. Thus decriminalisation has been 
singled out as a more effective means of enforcing the Act which is peculiar 
to the South Africa corporate governance needs. 
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3.3.3 Shareholder rights 
The 21st century is fondly referred to as the computer age. This is because 
the last decade has experienced an accelerated rate of technological growth. 
Coupled with these changes has been the adoption and increased use of 
these technological innovations by individuals, business houses and the 
society at large.120 Corporate governance has achieved major gains in the 
use of technology which is being utilised to promote shareholder 
participation. The physical presence of board members is no longer a pre-
requisite to holding a meeting as technology has enabled the various 
shareholders to participate through electronic means. The enactment of the 
Companies Act in 2008 has codified the participation of a director through 
electronic means by providing for the following: 
73(3) except to the extent that this Act or a company's Memorandum of 
Incorporation provides otherwise- 
(a) a meeting of the board may be conducted by electronic 
communication; or 
(b) one or more directors may participate in a meeting by electronic 
communication, 
So long as the electronic communication facility employed ordinarily 
enables all persons participating in that meeting to communicate 
concurrently with each other without an intermediary, and to participate 
effectively in the meeting.121 
 
From the above provision it is clear to see that the Act has achieved its 
intended purpose of promoting corporate governance by making the 
participation in meetings more flexible and easy for the members. In 
addition, technology plays a pivotal role in the dissemination of information 
to the shareholders and stakeholders by the use of emails or other updates 
that maybe made on the company’s websites. 
In Asia there is a moving trend towards promoting the active 
participation of shareholders in the governance process. For instance, there 
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has been the formation of minority shareholder groupings in Malaysia that 
act as watchdogs and provide a stage aimed at initiating collaborative 
shareholder activism issues that relate to unethical or management 
practices that do not instil a sense of confidence in the public in particular 
for companies that are listed.122 
In the US and the UK, the voices in the area of shareholder activism 
are becoming louder and louder as major companies have become 
accustomed to this growing trend in that it is seen as an integral part of 
achieving accountability. An important weapon in the activist’s arsenal is a 
readiness to use the public domain as a forum for initiating change.  
Therefore whether economies are strong or weak there is a growing trend for 
shareholders in publicly listed companies to make their views known. The 
wave of shareholder activism has been encouraged by changes in the UK 
corporate laws which have effectively assisted the shareholders to strike a 
balance between management and themselves as the scale seems to be 
firmly tilted in favour of the owners.123 
The area of shareholder activism is slowly but surely gaining ground 
in South Africa as most shareholders are encouraged to take up the 
responsibility that comes with the ownership of shares by opening relevant 
channels of dialogue with the managers of the company.124 Therefore 
activism demands that the shareholder should carefully pay attention to 
what is happening within the company and engage the company by putting 
into use their powers and rights vested in them by virtue of their position as 
shareholder. Shareholder activism has continued to set trends in South 
Africa’s’ corporate world as operations of companies that are listed on the 
JSE are continuously placed under a magnifying glass. The former finance 
minister Trevor Manuel had this to say: 
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Be alive in your power, develop a checklist of good corporate citizenship, 
attend general meetings, vote and understand your rights and obligations. 
My invitation to each of you, perhaps as a first step in your own shareholder 
activism, is to collaborate, to develop and publicize the checklist. It is the 
least you owe yourself and future generations.125 
Therefore it can be said that shareholder activism is a gain that has 
been recorded as it brings shareholders to realise the bargaining power 
which attaches with the ownership of such shares and as such it can be 
used as an agent of change in an instance where one is dissatisfied with the 
way in which certain issues are being managed.126 In essence, where a 
company’s performance does not seem to match the various expectations of 
society and the shareholders, the net effect is that such a company is likely 
to suffer significant consequences due to the robust attacks that will be 
made on management and its governance processes through the media, 
demonstrations and consumer boycotts which may be used as some of the 
mechanisms to achieve of stakeholder activism.127 
Corporate governance codes and principles that exist globally have 
strived to mould the norms of society in relation to the corporate structures, 
procedures and behaviours that will be deemed to be appropriate to that 
society’s needs.128  Derivative actions in the UK will not generally be upheld 
under the rule in Foss v. Harbottle129 if such an action was brought by a 
minority shareholder unless the conduct complained of amounts to ‘fraud 
on the part of the minority’. Only then can a minority enforce the company’s 
rights.130 The enactment of the Companies Act in South Africa has added a 
breath of new life in the remedy of derivative actions as this type of action 
will not only be confined to the company itself but is extended to cover 
various other stakeholders. A new feature that seeks to promote corporate 
governance in this area has been the extension of the right to commence an 
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action on behalf of the company by various stakeholders who may be 
affected by its business. Section 165 has been couched in a non restrictive 
manner in that the shareholders are no longer the only plaintiffs who can 
sue on behalf of the company but allows for a wide range of interested 
parties to commence an action.131 
Another corporate governance feature that is related to derivative 
actions that came out from the enactment of the Companies Act is in the 
area of class actions. Although class actions are a foreign phenomenon to 
South African common law, reforms to various pieces of legislation have 
seen the importation of this form of this form of remedy as being part of the 
current common law. This position is clearly fortified by the Companies Act 
which provides that: 
157(1) When, in terms of this Act, an application can be made to, or a matter 
can be brought before, a court, the Companies Tribunal, the Panel or 
the Commission, the right to make the application or bring the matter 
may be exercised by a person- 
(a) directly contemplated in the particular provision of this Act; 
(b) acting on behalf of a person contemplated in paragraph (a), who 
cannot act in their own name; 
(c) acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of 
affected persons, or an association acting in the interest of its 
members; or 
(d) acting in the public interest, with leave of the court. 
 
From the above provision it clear to see that various  players are 
placed in an advantageous position of forming groups or classes that are 
aimed at putting all of their efforts in trying to obtain some form of remedy 
for issues such as consumer rights violations they might have suffered 
within the prevailing corporate and commercial world of business.132 
Therefore class actions are a major achievement in corporate governance as 
they arm citizens with the much needed ‘fire power’ that can be used against 
an organisation that is being managed by directors who are not sufficiently 
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equipped to handle the various corporate challenges that exist in the 
environment within which corporations exist.133  
 
3.3.4 Corporate Social Responsibility as a shareholder issue 
The concept of corporate social responsibility is a corporate governance 
concept that has continued to spread its tentacles internationally. However, 
it is worth noting that there are variations as to how it is applied and dealt 
with from one jurisdiction to the next. The EU has linked the operation of a 
business vis-à-vis its stakeholders with the integrated and social concerns 
which maybe experienced in the currency of running such business 
operations. In the Green paper on CSR the EU stated that ‘ CSR is not only 
fulfilling legal expectations, but also going beyond compliance and investing 
more in human capital, the environment and the relations with 
stakeholders.’134  
In the UK, CSR concerns have made a lot of progress with some 
voluntary groups of UK companies such as the Business in the community 
taking up the mantel in promoting CSR principles that companies should 
treat employees fairly and with respect, operate in an ethical way and with 
integrity, respect basic human rights while sustaining the environment for 
future generations and encourage companies to be responsible neighbours 
in the communities within which they operate.135 For example: 
In 2010 retailer Marks & Spencer announced a new list of ethical and 
environmental commitments up to 2020, and its intention to become one of 
the world’s most environmentally friendly retailers by 2015. An initial list of 
100 five-year ethical and environmental targets had been announced in 
2007, including the aim of becoming carbon neutral and eliminating landfill 
waste and the company expected to achieve its targets….its targets for 2020 
including sourcing all food, clothing and home items from sustainable or 
ethical sources such as the fair-trade scheme and trying to persuade its 
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clothing suppliers, especially in India, to pay a living wage to its employees, 
but without adding costs for the consumer.136 
South Africa has not lagged behind in this regard as CSR has not only 
become a recurring topic in debates and conversations but also a palpable 
effort by various entities. The corporate governance guidelines, standards, 
codes and principles are contained in an all inclusive state of the art ‘tool 
box’ known as the King report which is highly recommended for companies 
that are doing business within the country. The progress that has been 
registered in the area of corporate governance has been summed up as 
follows: 
The launch and growth of the JSE social responsibility index (JSE SRI) in 
2001… informs investors and market agents about corporate social 
responsibility policies and practices of listed companies, encouraging 
investors to support ‘’friendly’’ companies and pushing corporations to 
reinforce their environmental, social and governance initiatives. Responsible 
investment is a relatively new concept (Dow Jones sustainability index were 
introduced in 1999 and the FTSE4Good index series was launched in 
2001).137 
South Africa has done well for itself in this area in that among the 
various emerging markets, it has taken the leading role in registering major 
gains as it was the first economy that launched the Sustainability index 
followed by Brazil in 2005.138 In this regard it is clear to see that South 
Africa is in the forefront in the development of corporate governance 
principles. 
 
3.3.5 Financial reporting standards and disclosure 
The 21st century has without a doubt come with major challenges such as 
the adverse effects of globalisation on the capital markets which have 
necessitated the need to merge the ‘locally Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles(GAAP) with International Financial Reporting Standards 
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(IFRS).’139 It is quite obvious that companies that adopt these IFRS are 
placed at an advantage over their various competitors due to the consistent 
nature in which their financial records will be produced. In essence, those 
companies that operate international outlets and branches have benefited 
immensely as the various offices use a standardised technique of reporting 
regardless of where they are situated which ties in with the other companies 
operations.140 
Another corporate governance initiative that has received a lot of 
praise which is peculiar to listed companies has been the adoption of rules 
that require the strengthening of precise and well timed announcements 
relating to price sensitive information. A classic example is provided by the 
Singapore Exchange Listing Rules which allow companies that issue their 
shares on the stock market to call for a halt in the trading of their shares for 
a period of up to three days in order to explain the rumours associated with 
such an issue and in addition to distribute any sensitive information 
relating to prices changes.141 
Companies that are listed on the JSE have since 2005 been required 
to apply the IFRS.142 This has resulted in the extensive revamping of South 
African GAAP in an effort to standardise them with IFRS which in turn has 
resulted in GAAP ceasing to apply with effect from 1st December 2012.143 
Ultimately, all the entities that use GAAP are expected to migrate to start 
using either IFRS or IFRS for SMEs. Therefore, this is a milestone 
achievement in promoting corporate governance as it seeks not only to 
promote transparency but also accountability. 
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3.3.6 Media and public involvement in corporate governance 
Various factors have been attributed to the development and growth of 
corporate governance in South Africa. The media and public demand for 
companies to exercise good corporate governance practices has been cited as 
one of the major agents of change and reform on this area. This is because 
the media has continued to play the role of a promoter and watchdog of 
corporate governance thereby being used as a tool for exposing all the issues 
relating to corporate governance whether such information is negative or 
positive.144 Coupled with this has been the ever growing public demand for 
transparency and adherence to corporate governance principles by 
companies. Naidoo stresses this point when she adds that: 
…investors and the public tend to keep a more watchful eye on the way 
companies are being run and, spurred on by shareholder activists and the 
media, are increasingly demanding greater accountability and better 
corporate citizenship from companies.145 
The media’s role is not restricted to merely gathering corporate 
governance information that is in the public interest but goes further to 
disseminating such information to the various stakeholders. This function 
was clearly seen in November of 2012 when the global coffee giant, 
Starbucks Corporation was reported to be avoiding payments of corporate 
tax despite recording sales of nearly £400 million in the UK alone. Due to 
consumer power and public pressure to account to the inland Revenue the 
BBC business news caught on to the story and made screaming headlines 
which resulted in the firm admitting that it needed to pay more taxes in the 
UK.146 This is a clear manifestation of how much power is wielded by the 
public and media when it comes to the development and growth of corporate 
governance. 
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To sum up, this chapter has clearly demonstrated that South African 
Corporate governance structures have not remained stagnant from 1994 
when the first King report was published up to date. It is said that the law 
changes and evolves in order to meet and satisfy the various needs of society 
and this has been clearly manifested by the three successive King reports 
which have responded favourably to changes in the society where they are 
applied and also to changes that have been experienced internationally. 
Most of the changes that have been recorded are without a doubt 
progressive in nature and have touched on various spheres of the economy 
which has had the effect of elevating South Africa to the top position in the 


























CHALLENGES FACED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 ‘if a country does not have a reputation for strong corporate governance 
practices, capital will flow elsewhere. If investors are not confident with the 
level of disclosure, capital will flow elsewhere. If a country opts for lax 
accounting reporting standards, capital will flow elsewhere. All enterprises in 
that country - regardless of how stead fast a particular company’s practices 
maybe suffer the consequences.’  Arthur Levitt147 
 
4.0 Introduction 
The last decade has seen the evolution of corporate governance as a concept 
that transcends all the sectors of a company’s operations and existence. As 
a result of the financial crisis that was experienced in the major economies 
of the world, various multinational corporations and banks went into 
bankruptcy which led to a loss of confidence by investors in the financial 
markets which in turn had a ripple effect of numerous withdrawals from the 
financial markets.148 However, contemporary corporate governance 
principles are being used as a mechanism for restoring investor confidence 
in the markets that were adversely affected by the financial meltdown. A 
classic example was seen in 2003 when investors in the UK and USA where 
willing to pay up to 18% more for shares of a company that had established 
good corporate governance structures149  
The implementation of any programme at any level is always faced with 
challenges. The manner in which those challenges are tackled will determine 
how smoothly the implementation and enforcement process will be. It is 
against this background that this chapter seeks to determine the various 
challenges and obstacles faced in the enforcement and implementation of 
corporate governance. Firstly the obstacles to the execution of the legal 
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framework will be looked at. This will be followed by the various challenges 
faced by regulators and how the limited awareness of shareholder rights 
compound to this problem. Furthermore, various issues that deal with 
disclosure in terms of poor transparency and how the problems associated 
with the new accounting systems affect corporate governance structures. 
The last part will concentrate on the weaknesses that affect the board such 
as the lack of transparency which characterises the nomination process of 
board members in relation to SOE’s, related issues such as unqualified 
candidates and the lack of knowledge of cumulative voting processes and 
then finally, a conclusion will be drawn. 
 
4.1 Weaknesses in rules, regulatory and audit systems 
Traditionally, corporate governance is seen as a new current that acts as a 
major driving force in the economic development of the world’s emerging 
markets although in reality it seems to turn a blind eye to a wide range of 
topical problems that attach to development such as anti corruption, issues 
of poverty, creation of jobs, political reform, education and the media.150 
It is without a doubt that 18 years down the line; corporate 
governance is still faced with enormous challenges when it comes to the 
implementation and enforcement of its framework. Simply put, ‘most 
growing economies that are in the process of transformation have been 
unable to consistently enforce the laws and strike a clear balance between 
the various rules and regulations that relate to corporate governance.’151 
Therefore the major obstacle lies in how entities will ensure that the already 
existing laws are religiously adhered to and complied with. 
Despite the existence of corporate governance structures in various 
world economies, loopholes have continued to manifest in these system 
thereby posing challenges to the efficiency and effectiveness of such 
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systems. The flowery nature of corporate governance has resulted into 
various entities having watertight and foolproof mechanisms and controls 
that are only existent on paper when in reality such controls are either very 
weak or at times even non-existent.152 In 2011, the financial markets in the 
UK were in a state of great disturbance and discontentment when UBS153 
suffered losses amounting to £ 2.3 billion at the hands of an employee who 
conducted fraudulent trading of the company’s stock due to the various 
weaknesses and failures in the existing internal controls and systems.154 
Kweku Adoboli the rogue trader was convicted exactly three years after the 
bankruptcy of the Lehman brothers Bank which paints a grim picture as to 
the effectiveness of corporate governance.155 The banking and financial 
sectors of any economy are very critical and need to be safeguarded with the 
most infallible corporate governance structures and control mechanisms as 
bankruptcy which is attributed to questionable management practices or 
unethical practices poses a threat to the shareholders, the public who 
deposit their money with such banks and the negative aftershocks will be 
felt more keenly by the economy 156 
The above situation has created precedent as to the weaknesses of 
corporate governance as the employee managed to conceal the fraud which 
went undetected even in the work of audits carried out on the banks 
financial statements which also raises further concerns as to the 
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effectiveness of the audit processes. Some of the concerns that have been 
raised include the following: 
A question could be posed…concerning the bank’s reported 2010 payment of 
fees to Ernest & Young of 67.4 million Swiss Francs ($59million) of which 
58.5 million was classified as audit fees to obtain the latest annual version 
of the standard auditor’s report.157 
The audit report was not received favourably by the various investors 
as it was riddled with opinions on the financial position of the bank that 
were not qualified or based on concrete evidence.158 This position justifies 
why the independence of auditors has continued to come under attack as 
they are viewed as mere cronies of the board mainly interested in being 
retained for the next financial year thus operate at the whims and caprices 
of the management that appoints them.159 
 
4.2 Flawed Corporate laws 
The corporate scandals that were being experienced the world over in the 
early 1990’s acted as a trigger event for various jurisdictions to adopt and 
implement corporate governance laws, rules and regulations. In the USA, 
the most notable one was the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) which was promulgated 
in response to the collapse of major companies like Enron and WorldCom. 
Since its enactment, the SOX act has received praise the world over as being 
the first corporate governance legislation which is a model of a mature 
market economy. However, in recent years this act has continuously been 
the subject of criticism as it is said to have ‘been rushed through both 
Houses of Congress with relatively little debate following the Enron 
failure.’160 Therefore, ‘Sarbanes-Oxley has manifestly not ameliorated the 
flaws persistent in the nation’s corporate reporting and assurance 
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structures’161 as it seems to be a politically motivated placebo that is aimed 
at misleading the public into believing that it offers solutions to the various 
corporate governance challenges. In the wake of a series of corporate 
scandals that continue being experienced in the corporate world, corporate 
governance has come under immense scrutiny and attack by various players 
who feel that it offers a raw deal as it is viewed as not achieving the purpose 
for which it was intended. Put simply: 
The more the cost of governance, regulation and compliance increases, and 
the bigger and more embedded in business life the governance industry 
becomes the harder it is to ask the question which really matters – will the 
current approach deliver the outcome we want?...the answer is an 
uncomfortable truth. There is huge scepticism about the current system, the 
principles which drive it and whether it will live up to the expectations of its 
supporters. If ever there was a clarion call for an industry to think seriously 
about where it is heading this is it?162 
The growth and development of corporate governance in most parts of the 
world has been hindered as a result of corporate laws which are imported 
from other jurisdictions and enacted into domestic laws with little or no 
modifications.163 In the long run such actions of copying and pasting tend to 
become problematic as the original laws do not take into consideration the 
various motives and needs of the local communities. In the same vein, 
corporate governance principles have suffered the same fate of being uplifted 
from models of major economies and applied in there totally which tends to 
presents challenges when it comes to implementation and enforcement of 
these principles. 
 
4.3 Key corporate governance concepts are not defined 
Despite corporate governance receiving so much publicity internationally, it 
has without a doubt been riddled with difficulties when it comes to its 
smooth implementation and enforcement. Various jurisdictions have fallen 
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in the trap of implementing corporate governance structures without 
considering the various problems and obstacles that will be faced in the 
process. Corporate governance principles are well thought out principles 
which if implemented timely are most likely to yield the best results. 
However there seems to be a trend around the world to implement the 
structures in a hurried manner so as to portray a picture of moving at the 
same pace as the international markets. Coupled with this has been the 
need to appease and advance the needs of the politicians who are in power. 
Asia has recorded massive gains in the area of legal and regulatory 
framework which has seen various updates to the laws and regulations 
which is in addition to the strengthening of various employee representative 
bodies.164 However the insufficiency lies in the inability to give the precise 
meaning to a number of corporate governance concepts which in turn 
manifests in loopholes in the enforcement of corporate governance due to 
the uncertainty it causes.165 It is note worthy that where key concepts are 
not defined, the end result is that the system will be filled with lacunae and 
this in turn leads to a lack of understanding of the major concepts that 
matter. This position was fortified as follows: 
All jurisdictions surveyed reported the lack of understanding of a number of 
concepts such as “material transactions”, “independent board member”, 
“fiduciary duty” and “related parties” was noted as a major obstacle for the 
effective implementation of these concepts.166 
Therefore, it can be said that the smooth implementation of corporate 
governance has to some extent been hindered by such insufficiencies which 
have gone silently unnoticed since the inception of most corporate 
governance structures. Although it can be argued that such concepts do not 
necessarily need to be defined, their relevance tends to emerge when giving 
clarity to the definitions of the various duties and responsibilities that 
attach to the officers of the company.  
In South Africa, most glaring loopholes have been sealed with the 
enactment of the Companies Act which clearly defines most of the major 
                                                          














corporate governance concepts. However, this does not mean that such 
concepts have been simplified to such an extent that they can be easily 
understood by the ordinary citizenry in that the Act is still tented with a 
number of complexities that would require the services of a lawyer in order 
to get a clear interpretation. For instance, part 5 of the Act provides for the 
various categories of fundamental transactions167 but does not give full 
definitions which can be clearly or easily understood. This manifested 
through the complex nature in which amalgamations and mergers are 
defined which cannot be easily explained in terms of the Act.168 
The board is vested with the momentous responsibility of managing 
the affairs and business opportunities of the company whilst at the same 
time act as the nerve centre and guardians of corporate governance.169 In 
order for the board to be in a position to effectively and efficiently perform 
the corporate governance tasks assigned to them, it is essential that the key 
concepts are clearly defined and understood. The Companies Act has gone a 
step further to incorporate and define a directors fiduciary duties which is a 
clear departure from placing reliance on the common law for clarification.170 
Furthermore, a director maybe declared delinquent or placed under 
probation by various persons who are given the right to make an application 
to court for such an order.  
162 (2) A company, a shareholder, director, company secretary or 
prescribed officer of a company, a registered trade union that represents 
employees of the company or another representative of the employees of a 
company may apply to a court for an order declaring a person delinquent or 
under probation if- 
(a) the person is a director of that company or, within the 24 months 
immediately preceding the application, was a director of that 
company; and 
(b) any of the circumstances contemplated in- 
(i) subsection (5) (a) to (c) apply, in the case of an application 
for a declaration of delinquency; or 
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(ii) subsections (7) (a) and (8) apply, in the case of an 
application for probation.171 
 
With regards to the above provision, the Act seems to have fallen short 
in that these concepts (delinquent and probation) are not defined in the 
definition section of the Act or the main body of the section which leads to 
speculation and uncertainty thereby posing a challenge to the 
implementation of corporate governance. In essence, for the avoidance of 
doubt and in order to eliminate speculation, the Act should have gone a step 
further in addressing these issues to achieve some level of certainty. 
 
4.4 Independence of regulators 
All over the world corporate governance is seen to thrive in an 
environment that is well monitored and closely regulated. The need to have 
a foreseeable and adequate environment that will enable regulation of 
companies is enshrined in the Companies Act.172 A survey conducted by the 
Asian roundtable on corporate governance revealed that one of the major 
obstacles to implementation and enforcement has often been attributed to 
the regulators inability and capacity to compel the obedience of the existing 
regulations due to limited resources.173 In addition to resource constraints, 
there are other non-resource problems that are general in nature which may 
be linked to monitoring and evidentiary issues that hinder the 
implementation of corporate governance.174 
South Africa, like most emerging corporate governance economies, faces 
major challenges when it comes to the independence of regulators and 
constraints relating to resources. This position was fortified as follow: 
Although there are moves towards promoting coherence in the regulatory 
system, regulation in South Africa remains fragmented and contradictory in 
                                                          
171 Section 162. 
172 Section 7(l). 
173 Andreas Grimminger Corporate governance in Asia: Progress and Challenges. Asian 
roundtable on corporate governance shanghai, 16th December 2010 available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/corporateaffairs/corporategovernanceprinciples/46892816.pdf 













many respects. Furthermore, difficulties arise in the administration of 
different forms of regulations.175 
In South Africa it has been widely accepted that dedicated regulators 
need to be in place in order to achieve the growing regulatory functions in 
corporate governance. However, in order to achieve some form of uniformity 
between the various regulators, their roles and responsibilities need to be 
clearly outlined although this is difficult with the various limitations faced in 
this area. 
 
4.5 Inefficiency and Ineffective Judicial System 
Another major challenge that has been faced in the implementation and 
enforcement of corporate governance in Asia has been attributed to the 
inefficiency, ineffectiveness and lack of specialisation on the part of the 
Judges in dealing with corporate Governance matters.176 Corporate 
governance is an area that is not highly litigated owing to the novelty of the 
concept which in turn leads to most judges not being proficient and lacking 
the requisite knowledge on how to adjudicate on matters in this area. The 
ripple effect of this lack of knowledge by the Judges is that the public tend 
to lose confidence in the judiciary when it comes to dealing with corporate 
governance matters thereby slowly eroding corporate governance which is 
seen as a golden goose that cannot be enforced even by the courts. 
In South Africa, the High Court enjoys widespread jurisdiction with 14 
divisions which are situated in different provinces. Some of these divisions 
are specific in nature as they deal with matters that relate to income tax, 
labour matters, divorce matters, land claims including equity court amongst 
others.177 Over the past 18 years, corporate governance has registered 
record growth and massive movements which has no doubt faced numerous 
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challenges in implementation and enforcement. However, it is disheartening 
to realise that there is no single division in the high court that is specifically 
dedicated to deal with corporate governance matters despite the concept 
having been adopted in 1994. Great importance has been attached to 
corporate governance as it is not only an empirical concept but is grounded 
on theory and practicality. This position was fortified as follows: 
Corporate governance in South Africa changed from being a “soft” mainly 
ethical issue to a “hard” issue, recognised as pivotal to the success and 
revitalisation of the country’s capital markets and ultimately, the prospects 
of the corporate economy.178  
The high benchmarks that have been set emphasise the need for 
enforcement however the challenge still lies in the inefficiency of the courts 
to deal with corporate governance issues. It can further be argued that 
because of the major hype that attaches to corporate governance, it surely 
deserves an established forum where any contentious issues may be 
litigated and adjudicated upon by experts.179 
 
4.6 The voluntary nature of corp rate governance codes 
Despite various corporate governance principles being codified into law by 
the enactment of the companies Act, various other principles still remain 
uncodified. It is a mandatory requirement for all companies listed on the 
JSE to apply the provisions of the King III code and report accordingly, but 
all other companies are merely encouraged to adopt and apply the various 
principles. Therefore, ‘there is no statutory requirement for companies to 
apply the principles or provisions of the voluntary code.’180 Because 
corporate governance initiatives and codes are not legally enforceable owing 
to their voluntary nature, most companies and organisations have been very 
reluctant to adopt and apply these principles as they are viewed as not 
necessarily being part of the law and thus noncompliance would not attach 
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any legal sanctions. This notion makes it easy for companies to fail or 
simply neglect to adhere to the principles. 
Furthermore, various entities perceive corporate governance as an 
additional and unnecessary burden which only adds to the long list of 
mandatory laws and rules that need to be complied with by the company 
and due to its voluntary nature, corporate governance is given little or no 
consideration at all. For various businesses, complying with corporate 
governance practices imposes financial challenges as the cost of complying 
with the various other laws is already high thus corporate governance is 
seen as an added unnecessary and yet cost to the operations of the 
company. This obstacle to the implementation of corporate governance was 
fortified by the Asian Roundtable which tried to address various corporate 
governance concerns such as ‘…how to make corporate governance 
initiatives legally enforceable, as companies are reluctant to adopt practices 
going beyond the laws, considering the costs of compliance as already high 
enough.’181 
From the above position it clear to see that the voluntary nature of 
corporate governance codes around the world, such as the King III report, 
still pose a challenge to the effective implementation of corporate governance 
principles. 
 
4.7 Heavy reliance on regulatory bodies for enforcement 
Shareholders of the company are vested with the right to receive dividends 
from the company in the event that these are declared which is a return on 
their investment. In order to secure this investment, shareholders appoint 
the board of directors who will be answerable to them. A serious problem 
that has been faced by corporate governance has been the reluctance of 
shareholders to institute investigations and assert their rights when it 
comes to questionable actions of the director opting to place too much 
                                                          












reliance on the various regulatory bodies. This position was fortified by the 
Asian Roundtable which provided that ‘ the passive nature of shareholders 
paired with a habitual reliance on government bodies to detect wrong-doing 
and initiate investigations puts the burden of enforcement solely on 
government bodies.’182 
This is also true for South Africa despite major calls for shareholders 
to act on their rights; most of them would rather depend on regulators such 
as the JSE and Financial Services Board for enforcement while they take a 
back seat in the face of flagrant disregard of rules and regulations. 
In 2010 the JSE censured Cenmag [Ltd] and imposed a fine of R1million on 
each of the [company’s] directors for contravening section 3.84 of the listing 
requirements. Specifically Cenmag’s board of directors had no audit 
committee, the office of chairman and chief executive were not separate, the 
company had no full-time finance director, the chief executive served as 
chairman as well as finance director and company secretary. In addition no 
independent directors served on the board and the board had no 
remuneration committee….the listing requirements-particularly the 
corporate governance requirements safeguard the financial integrity of listed 
companies.183 
The directors of Cenmag Ltd appealed the decision of the JSE to 
impose a fine to the FSB which upheld the fines and added that accepting 
the approach taken by Cenmag’s directors would amount to lawlessness.184 
The question that one would pose is why the shareholders did not act on 
such irregular actions and what were they doing while all these wrongs were 
being committed? This is a clear manifestation of how passive shareholders 
can be when it comes to enforcement of corporate governance as most of 
them would rather burry their heads in the sand and only appear when 
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4.8 Complacent nature of shareholders 
Shareholders are vested with tremendous amounts of power by virtue of 
their proprietary interests in the shares that they hold in the company. 
However, most shareholders seem not to be interested in anything else 
rather than earning profits at the end of the day which creates a problem for 
the implementation of corporate governance. Various recommendations were 
made by the King II report which are still existent in the current version of 
the King report which are aimed at improving and increasing shareholders 
involvement in the business embarked upon by the company. However, 
South Africa has for a long time been classified as a jurisdiction where the 
typical company AGM is carried out in under an hour which clearly shows 
the passive nature of shareholders as they do not exercise the powers vested 
in them by virtue of their position.185 The complacent nature exhibited by 
shareholders has a very negative effect on the growth of corporate 
governance. This position was highlighted as follows: 
[P]rimary governance responsibility lies in the board of directors. In formal 
terms the directors are appointed by and are accountable to the body of 
shareholders….the role of the shareholders is to exercise the powers that are 
reposed in them by the corporations Act and constitution of the corporation. 
The perceived wisdom is I think that shareholders play a passive role as the 
objects of corporate governance rather than an active role as part of it.186 
Therefore, the lack of interest by the shareholders of a company to 
take an active role in the affairs of their company is seen as an obstacle to 
the effective enforcement and implementation of corporate governance. 
 
4.9 Compromised quality of leadership and related matters 
In various jurisdictions, the board of directors is responsible for ensuring 
that the affairs of the company are manage in accordance with corporate 
governance principles. However, in Asia the role played by the board in 
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enforcing corporate governance has faced various problems such as the lack 
of candidates to occupy the positions available on the board.187 
The small pool of candidates not only for the position of independent board 
members but also for senior managers was attributed to a lack of 
qualifications, inadequate fee structures and the small number of candidates 
in some Asian Jurisdictions….188 
This has resulted in compromising the quality of leadership that the 
board possesses as it will be composed of members who do not have the 
requisite qualifications to implement the various corporate governance 
needs of the company. 
Asia has also faced challenges in addressing and promoting 
cumulative voting practices as there still remain some doubts as to the 
benefits of such practices in that most major players prefer the one share-
one vote policy so as to avoid being overruled by majority shareholders who 
tend to vote systematically.189 
In addition, small companies have reportedly been constrained when 
it comes to the enforcement and establishment of committees which are 
aimed at promoting corporate governance. This scenario can be attributed to 
lack of financial resources and in some instances, a complete lack of 
knowledge on how to go about setting up the required committees. 
The boards of State Owned Enterprises190 have also continued to face 
major challenges when it comes to the implementation of corporate 
governance. The nomination process of the board members has recorded a 
lack of transparency in that appointments are perceived to be politically 
inclined and thus the managers become indebted to the politicians who tend 
to derive some form of benefit and power from these SOE’s.191 Therefore, 
managers of most SOE’s are answerable to the politicians in power who seek 
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to champion their own interests at the expense of various corporate 
governance stakeholders. 
 
4.10  Disclosure Issues 
Transparency is one of the fundamental principles in ensuring that good 
corporate governance structures are established and therefore should be 
strictly adhered to by all entities. The advantages of being transparent 
outweigh the disadvantages of acting in such a way. It enables the various 
stakeholders to gain clear information that is not manipulated or tainted 
with fiction with a view to distract the public from the real issues. However, 
many companies tend to prefer to disclose only positive matters about the 
company while the negative issues are swept under the carpet in an effort to 
keep them out of the public eye.192 This problem goes to the core of 
corporate governance because of the adverse effects it tends to have on 
public perception. 
The convergence of local accounting principles (GAAP) with the 
internationally accepted accounting standards (IFRS) has brought about a 
different set of challenges to the implementation of corporate governance in 
that the new accounting regime are not cheap to execute which may be 
difficult for most small companies. Most of the costs that flow from the 
execution of IFRS are associated with enacting the accounting packages that 
are in line with the said standards. In addition, most jurisdictions do not 
have adequate numbers of skilled personnel to oversee the smooth 
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4.11 Entrenched Management 
Corporate governance has registered disappointing progress when it comes 
to penetrating management that has been firmly established over time and 
is old school in nature. This is mostly common for companies that are family 
owned and are motivated to maintain the “family tree” at the helm of the 
company at whatever cost.194 In such companies, corporate governance is 
usually received with resistance and hostility in that it is perceived as a 
mechanism that is aimed at destabilizing and usurping their controlling 
power over the company. In essence, the corporate governance structures 
that exist in such companies are only effective on paper but will usually 
have no practical application when it comes to the real issues that affect 




Having explored all of the possible demanding circumstances that could 
affect the implementation and enforcement of corporate governance, one can 
conclude that it is normal for any system to be faced with obstacles before it 
can start to operate smoothly. However from this chapter the question that 
still begs an answer is why do these challenges keep recurring 18 years 
down the line? It seems as if the turn of each year presents a new challenge 
that has evolved from the previous year’s stock of unresolved issues. 
Furthermore, one would ask if it is living up to the various expectations of 
the various proponents and stakeholders who depend upon its efficient 
running in order to sustain their businesses.  
Therefore, there is need to rethink the true objectives of corporate 
governance in order to find a lasting solution. It is noteworthy that corporate 
governance has faced various challenges in all sectors of a company starting 
from the legal and regulatory frameworks, enforcement and disclosure. 
                                                          












Shareholders rights have not been spared by the challenges together with 
the board which is the custodian of corporate governance. Looking on the 
bright side it can be said that all of these challenges faced are the residual 
effects of a functioning corporate governance structure and act as sign posts 
































5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Conclusion 
This paper has made an earnest attempt to take stock of the corporate 
governance progress and challenges in South Africa and the following 
conclusions can thus be drawn. The collapse of major multinational 
corporations in the early 1990’s can be said to have been a blessing in 
disguise in that it provided the much needed impetus for the growth and 
development of corporate governance. As a result of the international trends 
that were moving towards adopting corporate governance principles and 
practices, South Africa was encouraged to take a critical look at its own 
corporate legislation and this resulted in a landmark revision of the law in 
order to be on par with the various corporate governance principles that 
existed around the world whilst at the same time implementing the 
recommendations made by the King II report.  
After conducting a critical analysis of how the King II report has 
evolved into the King III report this paper has brought to the fore that major 
improvements have been achieved in corporate governance which makes 
South Africa’s corporate governance system uniquely stand out from the rest 
of the world’s corporate governance structures. This has been attributed to 
South Africa’s sophisticated yet emerging market that promises new 
innovations every day. Unlike other corporate governance structures and 
systems that exist around the world, South Africa’s corporate governance 
system has departed from the normal text book corporate governance as it 
possesses the qualities of a hybrid system which is the first of its kind in 
many respects. The hybrid nature of South Africa’s corporate governance 
system can be attributed to the existence of a unique blend of a highly 
refined economic infrastructure and growing economic market that has 













Since the publication of the King II report in 2002, South Africa has 
registered tremendous gains and changes which have come out in the form 
of the King III report and the enactment of the companies Act number 71 0f 
2008. South Africa’s steady growth and changes have been attributed to the 
consistent nature in which corporate governance issues have been handled 
by the King committee. The country has become the front runner and an 
authority in corporate governance matters because it has not change its 
winning formula even though at times it seemed as if the formula is not 
working. It is a delight to observe that South Africa has built on the various 
recommendations that were initially made by King I report through the 
publication of the King II and King III reports which have all seen the 
consistent use of the same working committee that seems to pick up from 
where they left off with each successive report and through the years have 
gained experience in dealing with the specific needs of the South African 
economy. In comparison, other corporate governance structures such as the 
UK have exhibited lack of consistency in handling corporate governance 
issues through the use of different committees with different ideologies and 
goals with respect to achieving an effective corporate governance structure. 
All in all, South Africa’s corporate governance structure requires a standing 
ovation due to the consistent nature in which it has developed in such a 
short period of time. Furthermore, the compromise to encompass the needs 
of the various stakeholders through the triple bottom line concept can be 
seen as a remarkable achievement. 
Ever since its conception in 1994, corporate governance in South 
Africa has continued to register steady growth and progress. The market has 
been cited as one of the most important agents of change that has 
necessitated its growth. Corporate governance operates in a market 
economy that is regulated by laws and regulations. In essence, corporate 
governance, the market and the law are the three aspects that cannot be 
unhinged from each other as they are interdependent in order to operate 
efficiently. Therefore, any change that occurs in any one of the three areas 












between them. This paper has thus shown that corporate governance in 
South Africa does not operate in a vacuum and this is an aspect that was 
built on by the King committee which saw the integration of all of the 
stakeholders of corporate governance. Furthermore, any change in corporate 
governance principles will act as a stimulant for changing the corporate laws 
either through amendments or by way of regulations which play a pivotal 
role in the development of corporate governance. 
Various areas of corporate governance have achieved prominence in 
the King I through to the King III reports. It is noteworthy that as a result of 
the King III report, companies are no longer incorporated with the short view 
of making profits for their shareholders but look beyond to include other 
stake holders and ensure the longevity of the company by ensuring that 
companies are sustainable in terms of profits and the way resources in the 
environment are utilised. An issue that emerges clearly during the course of 
this paper is that the progress that has been recorded cannot be measured 
empirically in that there is no set formula that can be used to measure the 
overall progress of corporate governance. Progress can thus only be looked 
at on a case by case basis, as what may be considered as progress in one 
jurisdiction may not necessarily be progress in another jurisdiction due to 
the difference in the pace at which it grows and also the difference in laws 
that exist in these jurisdictions.  
The approach taken by this paper in assessing the overall progress 
has been more theoretical in nature and sometimes, where the need has 
arisen, the practical aspects have been examined in order to come up with a 
concrete position. The major areas that have been identified by this paper 
relate to the legal framework which has received a face lift. Areas of 
enforcement and implementation have also seen the introduction of new 
regulatory bodies. Moreover, some of the major players in corporate 
governance such as the shareholders have been given rights whilst at the 
same time enhancing the board’s ability to handle corporate governance 
matters. Furthermore, the need for the board to be accountable to the 












To sum up, on can conclude that South Africa has done quite well in scoring 
major successes which can be built upon from one year to the next in an 
effort to remain consistently at the forefront of the corporate governance 
pack. 
Inasmuch as progress can be attributed to corporate governance in 
South Africa, its implementation and enforcement has not been all rosy and 
free from problems. This paper has approached the challenges and obstacles 
to corporate governance in the same vein as the progress in that it is 
difficult to confine the obstacles and challenges to an established empirical 
formula. However, these challenges have been looked at from a case by case 
basis and comparative aspects with other jurisdictions have been made in 
order to find the common threads that affect corporate governance from one 
jurisdiction to the next despite of the different systems that exist. Corporate 
governance has faced enormous challenges in the implementation and 
enforcement process whilst at the same time the shareholders have also 
contributed to the problems being faced due to their passive and inactive 
nature when it comes to dealing with corporate governance issues. 
Constraints in resources, skilled manpower and court systems have been 
seen as areas that pose challenges to the growth of corporate governance. In 
some jurisdictions the independence of boards (especially those of SOE’s) 
and disclosure issues have been identified as obstacles to the growth of 
corporate governance. 
Overall the progress that has been achieved outweighs the challenges 
being faced by corporate governance. The challenges should be viewed in a 
positive light in that they signify the areas of the existing corporate 
governance structures that need to be revisited and require more attention. 
They can thus be said to be a residual effect of a framework that is running 
and operating at full capacity. Any system that does not present challenges 
in its operations in the initial stages of implementation is at a great risk of 
grinding to a halt. Therefore, the challenges faced are healthy for any 
growing framework as they tend to act as signals as to the parts that require 














At the moment, South Africa’s corporate governance framework seems to be 
operating smoothly despite the numerous glaring challenges that have been 
highlighted by this paper. In its current state, if it is left unchecked, the 
challenges which are being experienced could potentially escalate and 
become even more serious and destructive. Therefore, it is against this 
background that this dissertation makes the following recommendations to 
be considered by the policy makers for implementation: 
 There should be an intensified campaign aimed at raising the 
awareness and activism of shareholders. There should be some sort of 
incentive for the shareholders to take an active role in the 
performance and operations of the company. 
 Judicial reforms that are aimed at creating specialised courts that 
deal with corporate governance issues are long overdue. In addition, 
these should be presided over by judges who are well versed and 
experienced in corporate governance matters, for instance some of the 
members of King committee can make good candidates in this realm. 
 The current cohort of judges should undergo intensive training 
coupled with vigorous programmes that are aimed at educating them 
on how best to deal with corporate governance matters. 
 The importance of corporate governance to the life of any entity should 
be inculcated into the minds of ‘lawyers in the making’ at an early 
stage through expansion of commercial law programmes, both at 
undergraduate and postgraduate levels, thereby making it a priority 
and at the same time sufficiently equipping them to handle corporate 
governance issues in future. 
 The corporate governance codes such as King III should be legally 
enforceable for all companies as opposed to restricting enforceability 












 There should be a reduction in government’s involvement when it 
comes to SOE’s whose focus should shift from serving the needs of 
politicians and encompass the various interests of other stakeholders 
as is required by the King report. In addition the various regulators of 
corporate governance should not be over-dependent on government as 
there should be some level of detachment from the government’s 
invisible control. 
 Providing intensive training for company secretaries who are the gate 
keepers of corporate governance and ensuring that these officers take 
a hands-on practical approach of ensuring that corporate governance 
principles are being adhered to instead of dealing with corporate 
governance as a paper based concept that lacks practicality. This will 
ensure vigilance and avoid companies from falling into bankruptcy. 
Lastly, it is noteworthy that the above recommendations constitute 
just a fraction of the amount of work that remains outstanding as there 
are various areas that need attention in order to achieve a corporate 
governance framework that is formidable enough to withstand the test of 
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